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THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE BARRIERS.
F. EUGENE TYIELDER*
In recent decades and especially in recent years the fact
of the increased economic interdependence of the world has
become well recognized. Also a group of economic problems,
known popularly as trade barriers, has been pressing for
therapeutic treatment, although there is considerable di-
vergence of opinion as to their best solution. The background
of these problems is found in the fact of man's growing con-
trol over natural forces and his inability to successfully
accommodate his political and economic institutions to that
fact.
In the course of the six-thousand years of recorded his-
tory one trend of importance for the present discussion
stands out. It is the gradual development of a world-wide
economy, in which the humans of all geographical sectors
are interdependent in some degree. To trace the history of
this growing interdependence would be to describe man's
gradual conquest of the natural barriers to human intercourse,
the water hazards of oceans, rivers, and lakes, the topo-
graphical barriers of mountains and forests, and the com-
munication barriers of space. It would be the story of man's
successes, in turning the principal water and space barriers
into marine and aviation highways for his commerce, in
converting the stored energy of the sun and the minerals of
the soil into the steel rails and rolling stock of his railways,
his surfaced highways and motor cars, and his various wires
or wireless communications. Every new success in reducing
the time and cost of travel, transport, and communication
was a step toward increased interdependence. Each such
improvement encouraged the exchange of more commodities
and services, as a result of which we see that, today, no
nation of the world can prosper and supply its needs by de-
pending wholly on its own resources and industries. This
very interdependence made possible industries which could
not exist without drawing upon many widely separated
sources of materials. For example, we could not have the
modern automobile if we did not obtain the non-ferrous al-




loys of other parts of the world, and other products of
foreign nations which are necessary to its manufacture. The
trend has been constantly toward a planetary economy. Man's
early steps toward such an economy were slow, but in recent
centuries his pace has been more rapid, until in the last cen-
tury progress in the technology of land, water, and air trans-
port has laid the foundations of a true world-economy.' The
world has been shrinking at an unprecedented rate and this
fact is of profound significance to economy as well as politics.
Bearing in mind these facts of shrinking space and eco-
nomic interdependence, we turn now to a consideration of
some of man's behavior in response to these changes. This be-
havior is generally considered to fall within the categories
of politics and economics alike, and may be briefly described
by the common name, trade barriers. This behavior is
represented by the creation of artificial impediments to trade,
which replace in some degree the natural geographical hind-
rances to human intercourse which man has removed in his
development of the technology of travel, transport, and com-
munication described above.
Historically, legal trade barriers as we think of them to-
day, accompanied the rise of modern nation-states as a feudal
economic order gave way to an economic order of "commercial
capitalism." The chief source of large fortunes in the new
order was the carrying trade and activities of the merchants.
Trade barriers consisting of tariff duties, imposts, embargoes
and navigation acts, were adopted as national politico-eco-
nomic policy primarily for the purpose of building strong
nation-states. The body of positive doctrines and principles,
which rationalized these trade barriers is known as "mer-
cantilism." The principal objective of these doctrines was
to enable statemakers to manipulate trade and resources so
as to maintain a "favorable" balance of trade, in which com-
modity exports are in excess of imports, in order to acquire
a net balance of precious metals. It was supposed that a
large reserve of gold and silver is essential to the strength
of a nation-state. It should be emphasized that tariff duties
and embargoes fit into this scheme as a principal method of
promoting "favorable" trade balances rather than for the
protection of home industries, against the market competi-
tion of foreign producers. However, protection of special in-
' STALEY, WORLD ECONOMY IN TRANSITION. (1939) 3-35.
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terest groups was not entirely absent from this legislation.
A case in point is the protection of the agricultural producers
of England by the "corn laws." Even in this instance the para-
mount purpose was not market protection before the Corn
Law of 1663.2
Beginning in the 18th century a new stage of economic
development began in England. This was the development
now popularly known as the "industrial revolution." Grad-
ually the economic order of Europe and many other parts of
the world became dominated by "industrial capitalism," as
an addition to, rather than a replacement of "commercial
capitalism." Private fortunes as well as the chief production
of manufactured economic goods were derived from the
factory system, mechanical transport and mining, under the
regime of "industrial capitalism."
In modern industrialism the political state took on a
democratic form. A modicum of economic freedom came -to
prevail. However, trade barriers were not extinguished but
were revamped to serve the needs of the newer economic
groups. Thus, the principal purpose of trade barrier restric-
tions was changed from the promotion of strong states to
that of protecting various domestic economic groups in the
enjoyment of favorable market conditions in their home
markets, freed to a considerable degree from the competition
of foreign competitors. In some cases, the import duty for
revenue purposes prevailed or was combined with the pro-
tective tariff, as exemplified in the tariff history of the
United States. At times tariffs or other trade restrictions
were used as weapons of retaliation by nations whose ex-
porters are barred from another's markets.
More recently, particularly since 1930, trade barriers
have been increased in variety and the purpose has changed
once more. Many nation-states, and especially Germany and
Italy, have made extensive use of many types of trade re-
strictions in co-ordination with their domestic policies, t6
gird themselves for aggressive war. This trend resembles
in some respects the restrictions of the "mercantilist" states
of Europe from the 15th to the 18th centuries. At least the
purpose of the statemakers, in maling the nation strong,
coincides. However, although the methods are similar and
the aims of strong states resemble one another, the modern
2 BARNES, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CORN LAWS, 1660-1846. (1930) 8, 9.
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policy becomes that of the building of an economy of "aut-
archy" or self-sufficiency rather than the acquisition of a
maximum store of "treasure" in the form of precious metals.
If we turn our attention from national trade barriers
erected at the boundaries of nation-states to the internal
trade barriers of the United States, we discover that the
generalizations which apply to trade barriers in the stage
of "industrial capitalism" likewise apply to the barriers
erected by state and local governments. Like national tariffs,
these state and local trade walls usually are intended to ac-
complish any of three ends: first, to provide a protected
market for home producer and merchant groups by dis-
couraging the consumption of "imported goods" from sister
political jurisdictions; secondly, to retaliate against govern-
ments which have protected their own producers; and
thirdly, to raise public revenues at the expense of those who
produce, market or consume "imported" goods and services.
Occasionally, state and local barriers arise unintentionally out
of the fact of dual sovereignty. That is to say, that impedi-
ments to the free movement of economic values may exist
because of the existence of a federal jurisdiction side by side
with state jurisdictions, in the field of trade regulation.
When the regulations of these dual sovereigns conflict, a
trade barrier of considerable moment may exist through no
premeditated fault of either government. Such obstructions
as these which arise out of dual sovereignty, often occur from
the fact that newer agencies of transportation or business
must be regulated to protect the public interest before such
agents become significant factors in interstate commerce.
Local or state governments introduce such necessary regula-
tion, because of their proximity to the problems, created by
these changes. However, the local and state regulations,
thus created, later become hindrances to interstate commerce,
when in the course of time, these regulated agencies reach
the stage when they become of considerable significance in
interstate commerce. This is well illustrated in the history
of the regulation of the steamboat, the railroad, and, today,
the motor vehicle.3
Again, sometimes these barriers arise, not out of de-
Se6: KIRSHEN, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, (University of Wisconsin, 1937)
Manuscript.
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liberate attempts of a state to harm the economic activities
of outsiders doing business within its borders, but out of its
failure to accommodate its legislation to social and economic
changes in order to remove trade restrictions that grow out
of the diversifications of a federal system composed of
forty-eight semi-sovereign political states. For example
when states maintain unique and non-uniform grading and
container laws, long after common standards have been
adopted generally throughout the country as a whole, such
laws operate as serious hindrances to the movement of in-
terstate commerce. Therefore if a state or local government,
by intent or in fact, creates, maintains, or administers pub-
lic measures so as to discriminate against outside competi-
tion, it is sponsoring trade barriers.
In some cases, no doubt, the internal barrier laws to
which national business organizations object are essentially
burdens which arise out of differences in conditions among
various regions of the country, which necessarily require
different state policies of regulation. Probably some groups
use propaganda against state trade barriers as a neatly veiled
method of attacking state regulation without desiring to
accept the responsibility of federal regulation. They would
like the barrier question to be expanded beyond its real
significance.4
A more specific examination of some of the economic
and social forces which have led to the creation of state and
local discriminatory restrictions on outside products, services
or businesses throws much light on the nature of these trade
barriers. Three factors or forces have been influential re-
cently, in producing the main forms of internal barriers in
the United States. The first and perhaps most important of
these is the world economic crisis and depression of the past
decade. This has been felt by most businesses, in a reduced
volume of business or a reduced income. It has also severely
crippled many states and local governmental units by re-
ducing their revenues and at the same time increasing their
problems and functions.
A second force is represented by "scarcity conscious"
established economic groups who fear the consequences of
4 See: Summary of testimony submitted to the Temporary National
Economic Committee by Mr. Leon F. Banigan, Managing Director,
National Council of Private Truck Owners, Inc., (March 20, 1940)
16, 17.
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changes in the methods and channels of marketing and trans-
portation. The groups thus threatened seek to protect their
markets by measures which tend to restrict the new com-
petitors. This behavior is exemplified by the reaction of
local merchant groups to the growth of nation-wide dis-
tributors using mass distribution methods, changes which
tend to short-cut older marketing channels, or streamline
marketing services to reduce the costs of marketing. Special
taxes or restrictions are devised to cut down the effectiveness
of the new competitors by increasing their costs or raising
their prices. Direct selling and chain store merchandising
represent examples of such competitive threats. Discrimina-
tory chain store taxes, and resale price maintenance laws,
illustrate reactions of threatened groups to the new competi-
tion. The expansion of our national highway network and
the improvement in motor carriers leading to increases in
interregional highway transport are changes which fall in
this category. Likewise, the older, well established operators
of transport agencies fear a loss of market opportunities.
Improvements in methods of handling commodities, such as
mechanical refrigeration, glass lined tank cars for milk, and
faster transport have extended the area of competition for
various agricultural products, leading to consequent disorgan-
ization of local markets and efforts to protect and preserve
these markets for nearby established farmer-producers. The
reaction of these groups threatened by these new forms of
competition is usually observed in attempts to obtain some
form of protection from the economic intruders. This seems
to apply alike to the creation of local as well as national trade
barriers.5
A third force or factor which has stimulated trade
exclusion legislation is the situation surrounding the return
of legalized liquor in 1934. The Twenty-first Amendment
raised the problem of local and state control, and in its word-
ing admitted the possibility of legal discrimination between
home and outside producers'
Pushed by the combination of these several economic
5 MELDER, STATE AND LOCAL BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN THE
UNITED STATES, (1937) 168-171.
0 Legis., Liquor Control-The Latest Phase (1938) 88 Col. L. Rev. 644;
Green, Liquor Trade Barriers; Obstructions to Interstate Commerce
in Wine, Beer, and Distilled Spirits. (PubliZc Administration Serv-
ice, Aug., 1940).
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forces, and encouraged by such legal changes, it is not diffi-
cult to understand why state and local legislators have some-
times succumbed to the desire to promote the security of
local enterprise or protect public revenues by restrictive leg-
islation, which in its real nature tends to prevent full pros-
perity or to hamper recovery.
Because the Constitution gives to Congress the power
"to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States and with the Indian Tribes,"7 and forbids any
state without the consent of Congress, to "lay any imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except as may be necessary
for executing its inspection laws,"" the states are nominally
without tariff making powers, and the power to exclude or
discriminate against each other's products. Exceptions occur
when Congress grants to the states its authority over inter-
state commerce, as it has done for example, in the case of
prison-made goods, or when a constitutional amendment
grants such power to the states, as in the case of the Twenty-
first Amendment.
The principal forms of state and local trade barriers
which have received court sanction are classified as "in-
direct burdens" on interstate commerce. These laws are
based on the states' rights or powers to tax and license those
enjoying property and other privileges or rights in the state,
the states' police and general regulatory powers, which in-
clude sanitary protection of the health and goods of persons
resident in the state, the power to impose quarantines, and
to provide for the safety of its citizens' property and to pro-
tect the morals of the population. Other types of laws which
tend to clog the arteries of trade, and are sanctioned by the
courts are based on the sovereign proprietary powers of
states or, as already stated above, they rest on specific grants
of authority to the states by Congress or Constitutional
amendment. The proprietary or corporate powers relate to
the conservation of natural resources and ownership of pub-
lic works and property. A short resume of the leading types
of these barriers with a description of the conditions or
groups which assisted to create them is perhaps the best
7 U.S. CONST., ART. , §8(3).8 U.S. CONST., ART. i, § 10(2),(3).
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manner of familiarizing the reader with their economic sig-
nificance. 9
Several types of discriminations are based on the tax
and license powers of the states. Many of these powers may
be delegated to local governmental units. One type of such
discrimination is represented by special taxes on certain
commodities which are believed by resident economic groups
to compete with products of the state. A good illustration
of this type of barrier is that afforded by the rather wide-
spread practice of restricting the sale of various types of oleo-
margarine, by special taxes and excessive regulation. On
the one hand, many dairy states levy heavy excise and license
taxes on the producers, sellers and consumers of margarine.
On the other hand, states whose residents produce a con-
siderable amount of food oils, such as cottonseed oil, soy
bean oil, and animal fats other than butter, commonly levy
excessive excise taxes on the sale of margarine within their
borders which contains imported oils such as cocoanut oil,
palm oil and babassu oil. Thirty states levy one or more of
these discriminatory measures on the sale of margarine.10
A second type of trade tax discrimination is represented
by the singling out of certain forms of enterprise or trade
channel, for example, chain stores, for higher taxation than
for other competing forms. Following the lead of Indiana,
whose graduated licence tax 11 was the first of its type to
be sustained,12 twenty-one states by 1937 were enforcing
graduated chain store tax laws.' 3
A third type of tax protection imposes discriminatory
fees and licenses upon merchant-truckers and non-resident
9 For a more complete discussion and classification consult other pub-
lications, as follows; Melder, op. cit. supra, note 5; Taylor, Burtis,
Waugh, Barriers to Internal Trade in Farm Products (U.S. Dep't.
Agric., 1939); Comparative Charts of State Statutes illustrating
Barriers to Trade Between States, Marketing Laws Survey (W.P.A.
1939); Melder and Green, Trade Barrier Research Bulletin Series
(Council of State Governments, 1939).
1oUsed car import tax laws, and carbonated beverage license laws,
as well as certain other commodity taxes, at times appear to
combine barrier features similar to the margarine tax and license
laws.
L IND. STAT. ANN (Burns 1933) § 42-301--42-313.
'" State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
13 Through court action and expiration the number was reduced to 19
by the end of 1939.
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canvassers. Such discrimination, also, is practiced commonly
by local and municipal authorities.14
A fourth type of tax regulation which discriminates
against the outsider and in favor of the domestic concern is
represented by premium taxes on foreign insurance com-
panies doing business within a state. Twenty-nine states
impose such taxes. Ten states exempt the foreign corporation
from the tax in whole or in part if the corporation maintains
a certain minimum percentage of their reserves invested with-
in the state. 5
A fifth type of tax discrimination is found in the alco-
holic beverage and liquor laws which have been enacted since
the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment. In their opera-
tion these laws are used to restrict or destroy out-of-state
competition with resident liquor producers or dealers, or to
protect resident producers of raw materials usable in the
manufacture of alcoholic beverages. 6  Although many of
these barriers are invoked under the state police power,
probably the most effective discriminations are produced
under the taxing power.
Three other types of tax measures appear to have trade
barrier aspects as related to interstate commerce. Of chief
importance are the use taxes, which when imposed without
an "offset" or exemption for sales taxes paid in the state of
sale imposes a double tax burden. This double tax, however,
is not a serious impediment to interstate trade.'i Neverthe-
less, all general use taxes, whether or not they result in
double taxation, may operate as trade barriers because of
their "nuisance value."' 8 These taxes were originally levied
to prevent loss of revenue caused by residents buying outside
the state in order to evade the state's sales tax. General use
taxes tend, however, to protect resident merchants from this
loss of business, as well.
14 Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, op. cit. supra note 9 at 58-67.
'r Melder, op. cit. supra note 5 at 44-54.
V' For a tabular presentation of these laws see: Comparative Charts
of State Statutes illustrating Barriers to Trade Between States.
Marketing Laws Survey, (W.P.A. 1939) 65-71.
17 Waters, USE TAXES AND THEIR LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND(Studies in Business No. 19, University of Kansas, 1940) 86-88.
38Melder, State Use Taxes as Trade Barriers (Trade Barrier Research
Bulletin Series, Council of State Governments, 1939) 2; Proceedings
of the National Tax Association (1939). Proceedings pf the Na-
tional Tax Association (1940) 384, 393.
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Another minor tax trade barrier arises when a state
taxes non-resident motor vehicles so as to discriminate in
favor of resident trucks and busses.19
A final type of state tax discrimination is the levy of
special taxes and license fees on "foreign" corporations in
return for the privilege of doing business within a state's
borders.20 As a trade barrier it is probably of minor im-
portance.
Police and regulatory powers are sometimes used in
such a way as to become effective trade barriers. Under
these powers, states exercise the functions of protecting
the public health, safety and morals. While performing
these functions it is often necessary to interfere with inter-
state and interregional commerce. When such occasions arise
trade barriers exist if the measures taken go beyond the
necessities of the situation and operate to the economic ad-
vantage of local residents and industries, at the cost of per-
sons or products of sister states. Necessarily, the distinction
between legitimate police measures and indefensible trade
barriers on many occasions defies the best judgment of the
experts.
Some of the more or less significant types of barriers
based on police or regulatory powers of the states fall into
five categories. The first category applies especially to dairy
products. Milk market exclusion by limitation of the area or
milk shed from which fluid milk may be supplied to city mar-
kets is accomplished by a refusal to inspect the premises of
some dairymen who wish to supply the market, or by arbitrary
and frequent changes in the sanitary requirements applicable
to milk producers.21 In addition State Milk Control Boards
have been created to regulate milk prices, not to hold prices
down as was the case in most public utility regulation, but
to hold them up, in order to protect dealers' margins and
prices paid farmers for fluid milk.22  All this is usually
done in the name of public health, but the obvious objective
is the protection of established production areas from com-
petition induced by modern transportation facilities.
'
9 Melder, op. cit supra note 5 at 77; Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, op.
cit. supra note 9 at 38-42.20 ielder, op. cit. supra note 5 at 41-44.
21 Spencer, Practice and Theory of Market Exclus~on Within the U.S.
(Journal of Farm Economics, Feb. 1933) 142.
22Melder, op. cit. supra note 5 at 111-117.
THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE BARRIERS
A second category of police regulation used as a trade
barrier permits exclusion of plant or animal products by
means of quarantines based on economic rather than health
considerations. Likewise, the regulation of the entry of
nursery stock, at times, goes beyond the mere control of
disease. Such requirements as the filing of large surety
bonds, permit tags to accompany each interstate shipment,
and the filing of special invoices with state officials prior
to shipment of nursery stock tend to seriously discourage
such imports. 23
A third type of police measure consists of restrictions
on the movement of laborers across political boundaries by
requiring monetary proof of the migrants' ability to remain
self-supporting.24 This category might also include the dis-
criminatory treatment of non-residents in police measures,
such as the ordinances enforced by municipalities prohibiting
certain types of retailing in the guise of preventing "public
nuisances." This is exemplified by the so-called "Green River
Ordinance" (named for the town of Green River, Wyoming),
which declares canvassing, soliciting, peddling, et cetera, from
house to house, without an invitation, is a public nuisance,
and therefore is forbidden. It is enforced in such a way as
to discriminate economically in favor of local or established
merchants. Such unequal economic consequences between
resident and non-resident merchants as those which arise
from the enforcement of these laws may not constitute legal
discriminations in the eyes of the courts, because the munici-
palities in question make classifications to fit differences in
conditions which the courts may regard as "reasonable." Al-
though these ordinances supposedly prohibit door-to-door sell-
ing by resident and non-resident alike, the municipal officials
are often inclined to wink at violations by the local resident.
According to one report, "In practically every instance where
passage of the ordinances was opposed, the sponsors as well
2Melder, Agricultural Quarantines as Trade Bariers (Trade Barrier
Research Bulletin Series, Council of State Governments, 1939).
Some quarantine measures are applied in such ways as to make
it difficult if not impossible to justify them on biological grounds.
For example, a few years ago, Texas barred out all Florida citrus
fruit except during the season when Texas citrus orchards were
not bearing. While Texas-grown citrus fruits were in the market,
no competitive fruit was permitted to enter. Melder, op. cit. supra
note 5 at 132.24 Melder, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 147-151.
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as the members of the city council openly declared that it was
not their intention to apply the ordinance to local salespeople.
As a matter of fact the Police Officers Association of the
State of South Dakota, came to the understanding, more or
less definite, that only transients would be subject to enforce-
ment. '25 Over 400 cities and towns had adopted the Green
River type of ordinance as of July, 1939.26
Fourthly, regulations of dimensions, weights and equip-
ment of interstate trucks and busses and the use of ports-of-
entry on interstate highways so as to curb the use of the
highways by the motor carriers of neighboring states, often
adversely affect interstate highway transportation.2 7  Even
though an interstate truck operator receives equal treatment
with intrastate truckers, nevertheless, he must comply with
such a variety of dimension, safety and liability requirements
that at times he finds himself violating one state's laws in
order to comply with the laws of an adjacent state. These
conflicting rules were not originally the product of pro-
vincially minded legislators, but the very multiplicity of rules
has become a real burden to interstate commerce. It is this
multiplicity of rules that members of the trucking industry
are complaining about. With the enactment of the Federal
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 the first step toward the solu-
tion of this problem has been taken.
In addition to being restricted by a maze of non-uniform
state requirements, the interstate trucker sometimes finds
his operations hindered by "ports-of-entry." About eight
western states operate these ports on highway entrances to
the state, as a means of enforcing their motor vehicle laws,
collecting ton-mile taxes and regulating the entry of nursery
stock and other commodities. Although in theory the port
officials do not discriminate against outside trucks, in practice
shippers and truckers and even private pleasure car travellers
lose time and suffer other annoyances to such a degree that
complaints are constantly heard against these stoppages.
Ports-of-entry are of such a spectacular nature that some ob-
25 Letter to author from Dr. C. T. Arlt, of Oberlin College, authority
on local trade regulation, as of Feb. 8, 1940.
28National Institute of Law Officers, Opinion Bulletin No. 46, (July
1939).27 Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, op. cit. supra note 9 at 42-49.
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servers consider them the outstanding example of what they
term the "Balkanizing of the United States.128
Still another form of discrimination is the establish-
mcent of state grades, standards and labels which do not con-
form to Federal or other state specifications with the re-
sult that the free movement of goods between states tends
to be interrupted. Some of these laws go so far as to re-
quire out-of-state eggs to be branded as "shipped" while
eggs from resident poultrymen are branded with the name
of the home state, or as "fresh" eggs.
Another class of barriers is based on the corporate or
proprietary powers of the state. As the sovereign, a state
is proprietor of the public domain, public works and such
natural resources as have not been reduced to its possession.
Furthermore as a corporate entity a state possesses the
power and duty of spending large amounts of public moneys
in carrying out its proprietary, police, and other functions.
Under their powers as proprietors in conserving natural
resources and owning public property and in performing their
spending functions the various states may exercise several
types of preferences which favor residents or discriminations
which penalize non-residents, with very little restraint from
the courts. The leading forms are as follows :29
First, as employers, states may refuse employment on
public payrolls, to any but legal residents. By "legal resi-
dents" is meant those persons who have maintained their
homes for a minimum period varying from six months to
five years depending upon the state, and qualified in other
possible ways, such as by the payment of a poll tax.
A second related policy which many states have fol-
lowed consists of favoring residents in the expenditure of
public moneys. One way in which this is carried out is to
require that public printing contracts shall be awarded only
to resident printing firms. Twenty-six states having such
a policy create a local monopoly on public printing contracts.
This principle of protecting residents against non-resi-
dent competition by means of granting preferences in the
expenditure of public moneys has been extended in recent
years to other groups. Thus twenty-eight states exercise
some degree of preference for state produced products when
28 Id. at 49, 50; Melder op. cit. supra note 5 at 75-78.
21, For a discussion see: Melder, op. cit. supra note 5 at 12-36.
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buying supplies for public institutions or building materials
for public works. These laws demonstrate an interesting
variety. For instance, six states purchase for public use
only coal mined within the state. Seven states require build-
ing stone and other materials produced within the state to
be used in the construction and repair of public buildings,
whenever such are obtainable. One state even requires that
textbooks for the public schools shall be printed within the
state. In all, forty-seven states have adopted at least one
type of citizen preference laws, intended to restrict the move-
ment into the state of products or residents of other states,
and to protect some residents or home groups from the com-
petition of outsiders.
Municipal preference ordinances are even more common
than state preference statutes. The city of Seattle recently
voted to put a 5% preference for resident produced supplies
into the city charter. Several California cities have sim-
ilar charter provisions. Probably hundreds of municipal-
ities informally practice such protection."
In so far as higher prices are thus paid for home pro-
duced products, such practices tend to increase the cost of
state government, at the expense of the taxpayers as a
whole. Furthermore, such measures may at times injure
the outside market for residents, because, as in international
trade, in order to sell abroad a group must permit outsiders
to sell their goods inside.
As conservator of public or even privately owned natural
resources, a state may place limitations or absolute prohibi-
tions on the export of products of natural resources, such
as hydro-electricity, in order to force industry, which would
obtain such products at advantageous prices, to locate within
the state. A specific instance of such an export embargo
is to be found in the State of Maine. Since 1909 Maine has
5'0 For instance, in February 1940, in Worcester, Massachusetts, one
councilman filed an order to introduce an ordinance to make such
public preference for resident business compulsory on city officials.
Worcester Evening Gazette, Worcester Massachusetts, (Feb. 9,
1940). The reason he gave for wanting such an ordinance was
that a floor contract for a public school almost went to an out-
of-town bidder. The councilman complained that when bids were
opened the outside concern was low bidder. To keep from giving
the contract to that bidder, it was necessary to throw out all
bids and call for new ones. On the second set of bids a local
concern was low bidder. It is evident that in practice, preferences
are customary although not formally expressed in ordinances.
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permitted no hydro-electric power to be transmitted out of
the state. 1 The law was enacted for the purpose of inducing
industrial plants to move into the state in order to take ad-
vantage of Maine's cheap hydro-electric power. It has been
in force for thirty-one years during which time numerous
attempts at repeal failed. Its constitutionality is unsettled.
Public opinion has been so strongly behind the law that the
electric utility companies of Maine evidently have preferred
not to test its constitutionality in the courts for fear of
antagonizing a more or less friendly public.
It would be a mistake to give the reader the impres-
sion that the recent growth of trade barriers between the
states has been the deliberate attempt of state legislators
to wall off their respective states from the rest of the union.
Many times lawmakers enact such laws in almost complete
innocence of their consequences. The trade barrier effects
of many motor truck specification laws and highway ports-
of-entry statutes are usually not foreseen. However, much
barrier legislation is probably motivated by the desire to
furnish protected markets to various resident special interest
groups.
Some trade barriers exist without benefit of legal en-
actment. These are invariably intended to give market pro-
tection to special groups. By their very nature, these trade
barriers between states, cities or other sections are secretive.
They exist extra-legally or illegally-which is sometimes the
best reason for their effectiveness. A barrier law may ulti-
mately be recognized as such by those adversely affected,
and if sufficient protest results it is sometimes repealed. A
trade barrier which operates without legal basis is seldom
recognized in its true colors, so surreptitious is its nature.
As a consequence it may exist successfully for years with
few consumers, taxpayers or other injured parties being the
wiser, and to the great benefit of the protected groups. In
fact so little is known of such interstate trade barriers that
they have almost entirely escaped the attention of barrier
law investigators.
A barrier of this general type is found in some cities,
in the building industry. Assistant Attorney General Thur-
man Arnold recently brought this to public attention as a
result of federal investigations preparatory to enforcing the
slLaws of Maine (1909) ch. 244.
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anti-trust laws. According to his statement whole building
industries, including labor unions, are so organized in some
cities as to virtually force home builders to pay exceedingly
high building costs as compared with the costs of construc-
tion in neighboring areas, by the device of excluding outside
competition through legal or extra-legal means.3 2
Sometimes public construction contracts are awarded
to local high bidders in lieu of the legally mandatory "lowest
responsible bidder." In such cases there may be collusion
between the favored bidders and the awarding officials. Yet
the fact remains that such discriminations are as effective
as barriers to free market competition as any tariff law
could be. They may operate for years, without discovery,
simply because the victims cannot or dare not divulge the
practice to the public. Probably no broad study of such state
and local barriers will ever be made, because of the diffi-
culty of gathering data on such practices.3
Information is not available to permit a full discussion
of all of the social and economic consequences of state and
local trade barriers. Furthermore, it is impossible to meas-
ure by statistics their cost to business, labor and consumers
in general. However, enough is known to be certain that
many such restrictions have a tendency to hinder a maxi-
mum utilization of resources and to prevent goods and serv-
ices from moving between producer and consumer with the
least possible friction.34 In so far as the existing barrier
laws tend to curb mass distribution and full regional special-
ization they are deterrents to national prosperity, and operate
to check the rise of our American standard of living. They
operate to prevent the full specialization, and interdepend-
ence which modern technology makes possible. Needless to
say their economic effects have not been uniform. Doubtless
favored groups have often benefited at the expense of con-
sumers, outside competitors, taxpayers and others. On oc-
casion barrier laws have been boomerangs to the very groups
which sought their creation and benefits. For instance, in
one state which attempted to protect its grape growers by
32 Crider, Government Attacks Building Jam, New York Times July
16, 1940) 7.
33 See: Melder, op. cit. supra note 5 at 84.
34 Summary of testimony submitted to the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee by Mr. A. H. Martin, Jr., executive director,
Marketing Laws Survey, W.P.A. (March 18, 1940) 6-27.
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a high tax on wines brought in from other states, the pro-
tective measure seems to have hurt the local wine industry
in two ways; first, by encouraging a great increase in the
grape acreage, as a consequence of which the home grape
production was expanded to the point at which it often gluts
the market so seriously as to force the price of grapes to
ruinously low levels. It also causes beverage consumers to
shift their consumption to other drinks than wine, because
of the high price they must pay for wine as a result of the
protective tax 5 In a majority of cases it is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure the economic effects of these barriers
satisfactorily. However, if they are viewed from their social
and political consequences, their results seem certain and
uniform. Invariably they have a harmful influence in inter-
state relations. Trade barriers, when discovered, produce
controversies and increase tensions between the lawmakers
and business groups of the various states involved. The
principal proof of this statement lies in the fact that so many
trade barrier laws and other practices have come into exist-
ence as reprisals for real or fancied injuries by other com-
monwealths. At least thirteen rather long drawn out inter-
state disputes over the use of highways occurred between
1931 and 1937, and involved the breakdown of reciprocity
agreements between states, reprisals, stoppage of highway
commerce, state expense, and serious loss to shippers.36
Before 1939 when the Council of State Governments
began a nationwide attempt to curb the growth of these
laws and to repeal such measures already in existence, there
had been a notable increase in disputes between the states
over trade and commerce, which were reminiscent of the
crisis period of state disputes during the years immediately
preceding the adoption of our Constitution.37
-5 For other examples see: Melder, State Trade Walls, (Public Affairs
Committee, Incorporated, N.Y., 1939) 19-22.
- Taylor, Burtis, and Waugh, op. cit supra note 9 at 42-43, Table 4.
3TId., at 28-29, 33-35; Melder, op. cit. supra note 5 at 36-38, 78-81,
104-105. Business Week, The War Between the States 31-36;
Taylor, Shall State Boundaries Become Chinese Walls? (Dun's Re-
view, October, 1939) 12-16.
